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A HUMAN FACTORS APPROACH FOR THE ANALYSIS AND THE ENCODING OF AVIATION
ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS: A VALIDATION STUDY
Pouliquen (Y.) ; Ferrante (O.) ; Jouniaux (P.) ; Nicolas (G.)
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA), Le Bourget, France
Cabon (P.) ; Rome (F.) ; Wolff (M.) ; Mollard (R.)
Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Appliquée (LAA) - Unité Ergonomie (EA1753) - Université Paris 5, France
Sharing safety information is a key issue to improve aviation safety. Therefore, it appears necessary to have a
common way to describe aviation accidents/incidents in order to get consistent data that will be used to produce
relevant safety indicators. This implies to use the same taxonomy, the same compatible software to facilitate data
sharing, and, more important, a common method to encode occurrences into safety data. The way human factors are
taken into account in the database must be improved since statistics usually provided, deal with accident/incident
categories and not with their various causes (most of them are human factors related). The BEA in cooperation with
the LAA has developed a methodology for the encoding and the analysis of aviation accidents and incidents. This
tool has been successfully used during several investigations but still needs to be scientifically validated. This paper
aims at putting safety analysis into perspective. It also discusses the methodology that incorporates the Human
Factors SHELL model and a validation study.
Introduction
The need for a common and standardized or scientific
approach has been highlighted for accident report
analysis (Zotov, 2000) and for encoding data from a
human factor taxonomy (Casetta et al, 1998). More
guidance for reporting has been recently published by
ICAO (ICAO, 2003) in addition to what exists in
Annex 13. Whereas the facts to be collected are
precisely detailed in Annex 13, its appendix only
mentions for the analysis: “Analyze, as appropriate,
only the information documented in 1. Factual
information and which is relevant to the
determination of conclusions and causes” (ICAO,
2001).
There are several approaches to analyze accidents
and incidents. The investigators of the A320 accident
of Bahrain (Government of Bahrain, 2002) used a
methodology based on the Reason model (Lee and
Mulcair, 2003). The Reason model (Reason, 1990) is
also used by the US Navy through the Human Factors
Analysis Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy
to encode occurrences to study error trends across the
years to prevent accidents (Shappell and Wiegmann,
2004). A need to validate the results of the encoding
process was also taken into consideration (Wiegmann
and Shappell, 2001).
The French accident investigation Bureau (BEA), in
collaboration with the LAA, has developed an
encoding method for occurrence (accident or
incident) analysis (Ferrante et al, 2004). This method,

1

which uses the SHELL model (Hawkins, 1987),
aims at collecting in an efficient way safety
information highlighted during the investigation
process and at guiding the investigator into the
analysis of the occurrence. The goal is then to be able
to disseminate this information through data
exchange, safety studies or statistics, mainly focused
on human factors and to detect accident precursors.
After the development of the method it has been
decided to validate it. It consists of verifying the
hypothesis that the use of this method harmonizes the
determination of causes among investigators and,
therefore, increases the reliability of the results that
are stored in the database.
This paper summarizes the ADREP causal model
structure, the questions raised during an investigation
and their associated levels of analysis. It then reviews
the methodology stemming from that model and
discusses the first results of its validation.
ADREP Causal Model and Associated Levels of
Analyses
ICAO adopted the breakdown of an occurrence into a
sequence of events which are then described and
further explained (see figure 1). This breakdown is
useful to classify the different questions that are
raised during an investigation and to illustrate the
various levels of analysis (Ferrante et al., 2004).

1

The SHELL model describes a system as the interaction of
humans with four elements: Software, Hardware, Environment and
Liveware. Each element of the model includes a list of items based
on a tree description.

578

reflect the causes of the occurrence. They primarily
relate to human factors. These explanatory factors are
classified according to the SHELL model which aims
at representing the interactions within the
aeronautical system. The BEA safety study on the
“get-home-itis” factor is an example of an analysis
having as a starting point an explanatory factor
pertaining to the SHELL model included in the
ADREP 2000 taxonomy.
Figure 1. Four levels of analysis based on ICAO’s
breakdown of an occurrence

Use of ADREP and ECCAIRS

The first level of analysis covers statistical aspects
for different criteria and safety indicators. The first
elements gathered right after the notification of an
occurrence generally relate to the fields of the flight
plan (departure, destination, type of aircraft, date and
time). The following questions first asked (who,
where, when?) allow to build safety indicators,
generally in relation to aircraft, third party damage or
injuries. They can be for instance the trend of
fatalities in General Aviation or the number of
accidents per geographical area. Statistics related to
aviation safety are thus mainly based on this type of
data, which are only validated during the course of
investigations.

This latest taxonomy with its 552 explanatory factors
represents the outcome of fifty years of investigations
throughout the world (Menzel, 2002). It is the third
taxonomy version after ADREP 76 (88 factors),
ADREP 87 (142 explanatory factors). This material
is helpful in tackling systemic issues during an
investigation. The clear separation between events
and causes, and the fact of having old causes
compiled into a taxonomy, help analytical
discussions within a team of investigators (national or
international). The likelihood of discovering brand
new causes is very remote and the ADREP 2000
taxonomy is a natural tool for exploration since it
contains an organized collection of all identified
events and factors that have, at one time, led to an
accident.

The causal approach breaks down an occurrence into
a chain of events. Each event is linked to a phase of
flight. The number "n" of events depends on the
complexity of the occurrence.
The majority of current safety studies are based on
these families or categories of events (events
correspond to the question “What?” or “which type
of occurrence?”). For example, the BEA issued safety
studies on fuel starvation events or mid-air collisions
(available on www.bea.aero), which correspond to
event categories. ICAO and other organizations
carried out safety studies on the category of
Controlled-flight-into- terrain (CFIT) accidents in the
last few years (Flight Safety Foundation, 1996).
ICAO further refines each event by using descriptive
factors. These factors mainly refer to aircraft systems,
operational or environmental aspects of each event.
They correspond to the question "How?". The
associated analyses are thereafter based on these
identified symptoms. They allow a first level of
mitigation measures generally geared to set up
palliative actions.
Each descriptive factor is in turn associated with
explanatory factors which, as the name indicates,
correspond to the question "Why?". These factors

The European Commission decided to implement the
ADREP taxonomy into a software, ECCAIRS
(European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation
Incident Reporting Systems) (Cacciabue, 2000). The
latest version (ECCAIRS release 4) incorporates
ADREP 2000 (and subsequently the SHELL model).
Its objective is to facilitate data exchange for
analyses on a higher number of occurrences.
However, in addition to a common taxonomy and a
common software (ECCAIRS), it is fundamental to
have consistent data to prevent biased analyses. This
highlights the need of a common methodology to
harmonize safety data. Encoding should reflect the
report analysis where descriptive and explanatory
factors are discussed to elaborate the conclusions.
Two types of practice are currently undertaken to
encode an occurrence into ECCAIRS. The first one is
done on achieved investigations based on the analysis
and the findings of the published reports. This work
is generally difficult because an encoder tends to
interpret what the investigator had in mind when he
wrote his report. It is recommended to stay as
objective as possible in order to avoid entering
subjective (biased) data in case of interpretation. This
approach alters data quality because it is not the
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person who best knows the case that encodes it. The
second one, more appropriate, builds the codification
as part of the analysis process to help investigators to
elaborate the occurrence causal chain based on
factual information and to tackle human factor issues.
It has been successfully used during several
investigations.

contain key elements (action, omission, decision,
failures, etc.) which will be used to elaborate the
sequence of events. Each event is then associated
with a phase of flight. A collective approach allows
reducing the loss of information and helps dealing
with subjective elements, like a witness statement
that can be conflicting with factual information.

For example, an accident report to a Boeing B737200 at Tamanrasset (Government of Algeria, 2004)
and a serious incident report to a MD83 at Nantes
(BEA, 2004), were based on the encoding method.
The analyses of these occurrences were undertaken in
parallel with encoding and highlighted human factors
and systemic issues. In the case of the Tamanrasset
accident, this methodology provided tangible
material for supporting teamwork, within an
international team with people of different
backgrounds. It greatly helped putting together the
different pieces of the puzzle in the analysis. The
main advantage stemmed from the visual tree
description of events and factors that illustrate the
depth of the investigation. It was thus a powerful and
convincing incentive to tackle root causes and their
underlying systemic factors.

The descriptive factors precise each event and
describe the technical facts and the decisions made
by actors which might be later considered as
symptoms. One (or more) modifier qualifies each
descriptive factor.

Principles of the Encoding Method

To validate the encoding method, it is necessary to
ensure that it is applied the same way by different
investigators.

The main steps of the method are presented in Figure
2 (Ferrante et al, 2004).

The explanatory factors, as they represent the human
factor aspects, are chosen within the list given by
ADREP 2000, based on the SHELL model. The treelists are used as checklists and the explanatory factors
are determined after a systematic check. The creation
of a table linking the factors to factual elements
proved to be very helpful for the justification of the
final codification and subsequently the writing of the
analysis.
Validation Method for Data Consistency

The validation purpose is to assess the variability of
the encoding. Expecting zero variability seems
unrealistic. Nevertheless, two investigators using the
same method and the same tools should produce
similar encoding. The study of the variability of this
encoding process should lead to identify the reasons
why variability exists. Afterwards, it should be
possible to adjust the encoding method by adding
enhanced “rules of encoding” to keep the variability
as low as possible.
Assessing Variability
To assess encoding variability, the following protocol
was applied:
• production of several codifications (sets) per
occurrence,
• comparison of the different codifications related
to the same occurrence.
Figure 2. Main steps of the encoding method
The first step consists in determining the events
leading to the accident/incident. Flight Data Recorder
(FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data,
radar tracks, witness statements and all other
information available during the investigation process

A higher number of codifications per occurrence and
more occurrences make it easier to bring to light the
origin of variability. Therefore it was decided to start
with general aviation occurrences, since they are less
complex than public transport occurrences and
consequently easier to encode in high numbers.
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Obviously, this protocol will have to be considered,
in a second step, on public transport occurrences,
since ADREP 2000 is more dedicated to commercial
aviation. The first step, however, consisted of
defining criteria to compare different codifications,
thus producing initial results.

system. This occurrence was followed by a service
bulletin and an airworthiness directive (BEA, 2003).
These findings were encoded as illustrated hereafter:
Group 1:

Production of Several Codifications
Group 2:

During the analysis and encoding steps, two
processes can create variability :
• investigators may diverge on the analysis of the
same factual information, or
• they may draw the same analysis (same scenario
and causes) but without selecting the same
elements from ADREP 2000 taxonomy to
encode it.
It was first decided to assess the second type of
variability, meaning to assess the use of ADREP
2000 by investigators more as an encoding tool than
an analytical tool.
Consequently ten occurrences extracted from the
General Aviation Bulletin (factual information,
analysis and causal factors already available)
published by BEA, were given to three separate
groups, each composed of one investigator and one
human factor specialist. Each group encoded
separately these occurrences and highlighted the
textual information contained in the report justifying
their choices. Doing so, the three sub-levels of
codification were covered: events, descriptive and
explanatory factors. Then, a comparison of the three
resulting codifications was performed in order to
quantify and qualify differences.
Comparison of Different Codifications

Group 3:

Final codification:

Figure 3. Comparison and integration of three
codifications
For a given occurrence like the Diamond DA-40
case, all the ADREP 2000 items selected by any of
the three groups were listed. For each item, the
agreement was scored as follows:
• if selected only by one group, then a “no
agreement” was considered,
• if selected by two groups, then a “partial
agreement” was considered,
• if selected by the three groups, then a “total
agreement” was considered.
Figure 4 shows the results of the agreement between
the three groups broken down into the three encoding
levels: events, descriptive and explanatory factors.

The next step was to compare the three codifications
produced for the same occurrence.

90.00
80.00
70.00
60.00
% of agreement

For each occurrence, each pair explained to the others
the rationale of encoding the occurrence. During the
debriefing, the three groups agreed on a final
codification. A significant finding is that the collective
approach for encoding helps, as expected, to reduce
variability between individuals’ interpretation and to
produce an agreed final codification.

No agreement

50.00

Partial agreement
40.00

Total agreement

30.00
20.00
10.00

The following example represents three different
codifications and the final one for an accident to a
Diamond DA-40 that encountered a power loss
during its initial climb. The pilot made a forced
landing. The BEA established that the cause of the
accident was due to inadequate design of the fuel

0.00
Events

Descritpive
factors

Explanatory
factors

Figure 4. Percentage of the encoding agreement for
three groups
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This comparison shows that variability is higher for
explanatory factors than for events and descriptive
factors. The nature of the report itself could be a
limitation to this validation study since based on a
limited analytical narrative.

•

In addition, this comparison method does not take
into account:
• the tree description of ADREP 2000 that leads to
score a difference if the items are not strictly
identical, although they may belong to the same
branch (see figure 5). It would be worth
assessing this “proximity” and taking it into
account in a further comparison; and
• that a single explanatory factor can be present in
two different codifications but without being
linked to the same descriptive factor and event.
For example, the item “fatigue” can be related to
different factors and events.

•

•

•

Figure 5. Tree-list of ADREP events
This disembodiment of human factor data (Decker,
2001) has to be integrated in an improved
comparison process.
These initial results highlight that there are several
ways to study differences between codifications.
Significant and acceptable differences must be
defined. The next step would be to generate a more
suitable comparison process. This is still being
undertaken.
Initial Explanations and Supplementary Results
The list of points or questions that follows gives
initial explanations for this variability, which is
related to the use of ADREP 2000 taxonomy through
ECCAIRS:
• Investigators do not always check the definition
of the ADREP term they select. Therefore, these
shortcuts, related to sometimes ambiguous terms,
can lead to different interpretations. The on-

going learning process has an additional impact
on variability.
A given fact can sometimes be encoded as an
event or a descriptive factor.
Should the breakdown of an occurrence into a
chain of events highlight the chronological order
of the events or the causal link between events ?
This question was answered by placing the
causal link as early as possible in the sequence of
events, in line with prevention strategies that aim
at detecting as early as possible any precursors
before they lead to an accident.
The events and factors section of ADREP 2000
is made of 493 events, 1550 descriptive factors
and 552 explanatory factors. Although these
numerous elements allow to precisely encode
any occurrence, it is sometimes difficult to
choose the term that suits the best. Moreover, all
investigators do not have the same knowledge of
this extended taxonomy.
When the report is precise enough about a given
human factor (e.g. get home-itis, channelized
attention, fatigue/alertness), there is generally no
variability. When the report does not formally
identify a human factor but hints at it, the
variability increases because investigators tend to
interpret it.

Many of these points are related to training on the use
of the method and knowledge of the ADREP 2000
taxonomy. The on-going validation study allows to
streamline the methodology and obtain more
consistent data.
Conclusion
This pre-validation study has covered a limited
number of occurrences from the General Aviation
Bulletin where the results of investigations are given
in a concise way. On these rather simple cases, a
validation protocol was developed. This approach,
initially limited to published reports, needs to be
enlarged to the direct analysis of factual information,
as foreseen for the production of codifications. This
represents a time-consuming task for the various
groups. It will be even more cumbersome on more
complex investigations (with a higher number of
events), which generally involve public transport
aircraft. This on-going validation study already
brought supplementary results to fine-tune the
encoding methodological process.
The encoding methodology showed its usefulness on
several cases, where a consensus was found for the
final codification and for the report analysis. The step
by step/iterative approach greatly contributes to its

582

practical use as a tangible support for teamwork. It
gives a clear visual understanding of the accident
sequence and the associated causes. Investigators
have a different knowledge of the extended ADREP
2000 taxonomy. It introduces variability in some
codifications and highlights the need for training on
the events, descriptive and human factors to share a
common understanding of the ADREP definitions.
In the long run, if everybody shares the same
concepts, definitions, tools and methods, future
prevention measures could be based on standardized
and validated results from different countries.
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